IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v33y2020i12p5594-5629..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution

Author

Listed:
  • Ansgar Walther
  • Lucy White
  • Itay Goldstein

Abstract

Recent reforms have given regulators broad powers to “bail-in” bank creditors during financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity, regulators must avoid signaling negative private information to creditors. Therefore, optimal bail-ins in bad times only depend on public information. As a result, the optimal policy cannot be implemented if regulators have wide discretion, due to an informational time-inconsistency problem. Rules mandating tough bail-ins after bad public signals, or contingent convertible (co-co) bonds, improve welfare. We further show that bail-in and bailout policies are complementary: if bailouts are possible, then discretionary bail-ins are more effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Walther & Lucy White & Itay Goldstein, 2020. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(12), pages 5594-5629.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:12:p:5594-5629.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa032
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carmela Aurora Attinà & Pierluigi Bologna, 2021. "TLAC-eligible debt: who holds it? A view from the euro area," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 604, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Keister, Todd & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2023. "Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    3. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2022. "Capital forbearance in the bank recovery and resolution game," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 884-904.
    4. Giulio Velliscig & Maurizio Polato & Josanco Floreani & Enrica Bolognesi, 2024. "The bail-in credibility: barking dogs seldom bite," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, March.
    5. Segura, Anatoli & Suarez, Javier, 2023. "Bank restructuring under asymmetric information: The role of bad loan sales," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    6. Igan, Deniz & Lambert, Thomas & Wagner, Wolf & Zhang, Eden Quxian, 2022. "Winning connections? Special interests and the sale of failed banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    7. Małgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska & Łukasz Kurowski & Bartosz Witkowski, 2023. "Resolution and depositors’ trust empirical analysis of three resolution cases in Poland," Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(2), pages 239-265, May.
    8. Velliscig, Giulio & Floreani, Josanco & Polato, Maurizio, 2022. "How do bail-in amendments in Directive (EU) 2017/2399 affect the subordinated bond yields of EU G-SIBs?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 173-189.
    9. Böhnke, Victoria & Ongena, Steven & Paraschiv, Florentina & Reite, Endre J., 2023. "Back to the roots of internal credit risk models: Does risk explain why banks' risk-weighted asset levels converge over time?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    10. Gu, Jiadong, 2023. "Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    11. Rafael Matta & Enrico Perotti, 2024. "Pay, Stay, or Delay? How to Settle a Run," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(4), pages 1368-1407.
    12. Gropp, Reint & Mosk, Thomas & Ongena, Steven & Simac, Ines & Wix, Carlo, 2024. "Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 830-862, March.
    13. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    14. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico C. & Suárez, Javier, 2020. "Bank capital forbearance and serial gambling," Discussion Papers 56/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    15. Małgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska & Krzysztof Jackowicz & Maciej Karczmarczyk, 2021. "“The Crooked Smile of TCR†: Banks’ Solvency and Restructuring Costs in the European Banking Industry," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, September.
    16. König, Philipp Johann & Mayer, Paul & Pothier, David, 2022. "Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks," Discussion Papers 10/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    17. Cerasi, Vittoria & Galfrascoli, Paola, 2023. "Bail-in and bank funding costs," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    18. Couaillier, Cyril & Reghezza, Alessio & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Scopelliti, Alessandro, 2022. "How to release capital requirements during a pandemic? Evidence from euro area banks," Working Paper Series 2720, European Central Bank.
    19. Siema Hashemi, 2024. "Banking on Resolution: Portfolio Effects of Bail-in vs. Bailout," Working Papers wp2024_2410, CEMFI.
    20. Martien Lamers & Thomas Present & Nicolas Soenen & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2023. "Does BRRD mitigate the bank-to-sovereign risk channel?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 23/1060, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:12:p:5594-5629.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.