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Bank Resolution Regimes and Systemic Risk

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  • Beck, Thorsten
  • Radev, Dayen
  • Schnabel, Isabel

Abstract

We assess the ability of bank resolution frameworks to deal with systemic banking fragility. Using a novel and detailed database on bank resolution regimes in 22 member countries of the Financial Stability Board, we show that systemic risk, as measured by â–³CoVaR, increases more for banks in countries with more comprehensive bank resolution frameworks after negative system-wide shocks, such as Lehman Brothers' default, while it decreases more after positive system-wide shocks, such as Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes'' speech. These results suggest that more comprehensive bank resolution may exacerbate the effect of system-wide shocks and should not be solely relied on in cases of systemic distress.

Suggested Citation

  • Beck, Thorsten & Radev, Dayen & Schnabel, Isabel, 2020. "Bank Resolution Regimes and Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 14724, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14724
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Modena, Andrea, 2020. "Recapitalization, bailout, and long-run welfare in a dynamic model of banking," SAFE Working Paper Series 292, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2022. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Isabel Schnabel, 2020. "Are Banks Finally Resolvable? A Perspective from Europe," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(S1), pages 77-86, October.
    4. Carmela Aurora Attinà & Pierluigi Bologna, 2021. "TLAC-eligible debt: who holds it? A view from the euro area," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 604, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Aleksy Leeuwenkamp, 2022. "Making heads or tails of systemic risk measures," Papers 2206.02582, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    6. Andrea Modena, 2020. "Recapitalization, Bailout, and Long-run Welfare in a Dynamic Model of Banking," Working Papers 2020:23, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    7. Cappelletti, Giuseppe & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2023. "The role of credit lines and multiple lending in financial contagion and systemic events," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    8. Martien Lamers & Thomas Present & Nicolas Soenen & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2023. "BRRD credibility and the bank-sovereign nexus," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(10), pages 1308-1313, June.
    9. Haufler, Andreas, 2021. "Regulatory and bailout decisions in a banking union," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    10. Mario Bellia & Sara Maccaferri & Sebastian Schich, 2022. "Limiting too-big-to-fail: market reactions to policy announcements and actions," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(4), pages 368-389, December.
    11. Martien Lamers & Thomas Present & Nicolas Soenen & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2023. "Does BRRD mitigate the bank-to-sovereign risk channel?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 23/1060, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank resolution regimes; Bail-in; Systemic risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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