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Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market

Author

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  • Levent Altinoglu
  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

The concentration of risk within the financial system leads to systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk-taking incentives of financial institutions when the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing interbank claims, risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This concentrated structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crises in a privately optimal way but leads to excessive risk taking even by peripheral institutions. Interconnectedness and excessive risk taking reinforce one another. Macroprudential regulation that limits the interconnectedness of risky institutions improves welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Levent Altinoglu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2023. "Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 35-64, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:15:y:2023:i:2:p:35-64
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20210333
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    Cited by:

    1. Verberi, Can & Yasar, Sema & Sugozu, Ibrahim Halil, 2023. "Capital liberalization, growth and moral hazard: Lessons from the global financial crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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