IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/uclawp/329.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Two Models of Speculation and Information

Author

Listed:
  • Jack Hirshleifer

    (UCLA)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack Hirshleifer, 1984. "Two Models of Speculation and Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 329, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:329
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp329.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George Feiger, 1976. "What is Speculation?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 677-687.
    2. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-1181, September.
    3. Ronald I. McKinnon, 1967. "Futures Markets, Buffer Stocks, and Income Stability for Primary Producers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(6), pages 844-844.
    4. Stephen W. Salant, 1976. "Hirshleifer on Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 667-675.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Information and Competitive Price Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 246-253, May.
    6. J. Hirshleifer, 1975. "Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(4), pages 519-542.
    7. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1981. "Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September.
    8. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    10. Anderson, Ronald W & Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1983. "Hedger Diversity in Futures Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(37), pages 370-389, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael A. S. Guth, 1989. "Intrinsic Uncertainty And Common-Knowledge Priors In Financial Economics," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 12(4), pages 269-283, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
    2. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin & Dimitri Vayanos, 2019. "Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(1), pages 371-399, February.
    3. Dow James & Gorton Gary, 1995. "Profitable Informed Trading in a Simple General Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 327-369, December.
    4. Felipe Zurita, 2001. "Speculation in Financial Markets: A Survey," Documentos de Trabajo 197, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    5. Felipe Zurita, 2004. "Essays on Speculation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000849, David K. Levine.
    6. Andreas Röthig, 2009. "Microeconomic Risk Management and Macroeconomic Stability," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-642-01565-6, December.
    7. Jean-Claude Bosch, 1983. "Speculation And The Market For Recommendations," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 6(2), pages 103-113, June.
    8. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Schmukler, Sergio L, 2000. "Country Funds and Asymmetric Information," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(3), pages 177-195, July.
    9. Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2011. "No trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 66-87, January.
    10. Jason Shachat & Anand Srinivasan, 2022. "Informational Price Cascades and Non-Aggregation of Asymmetric Information in Experimental Asset Markets," Journal of Behavioral Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 388-407, November.
    11. John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kim, Jae-Gyeong, 1993. "Futures markets in an open economy," ISU General Staff Papers 1993010108000011461, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Torben M. Andersen, 1992. "Differential information and excessive volatility in financial markets," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 3-11, Spring.
    14. David Hirshleifer & Sonya S. Lim & Siew Hong Teoh, 2011. "Limited Investor Attention and Stock Market Misreactions to Accounting Information," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 35-73.
    15. Ian Gale & Joseph Stiglitz, 1989. "A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient," NBER Working Papers 3209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Berliant, Marcus & Yu, Chia-Ming, 2013. "Rational expectations in urban economics," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 197-208.
    17. Nyborg, Karine, 2021. "A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning," Memorandum 2/2021, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    18. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1406, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    19. Marcelo Pinheiro, 2005. "Informational asymmetries and a multiplier effect on price correlation and trading," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 395-421, October.
    20. Challe, Edouard & Chrétien, Edouard, 2015. "Market composition and price informativeness in a large market with endogenous order types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 679-696.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.