IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/osloec/2021_002.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning

Author

Listed:

Abstract

I demonstrate a straightforward but apparently widely unrecognized implication of the standard requirements for perfect competition: an economy in which consumers can choose to learn is generally not perfectly competitive. In particular, if endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices by all consumers are guaranteed. If the new information is not shared with everyone, asymmetric information arise; if information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nyborg, Karine, 2021. "A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning," Memorandum 2/2021, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2021_002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/Memoranda/working-papers/pdf-files/2021/memo-02-2021.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    4. Tore Ellingsen & Elena Paltseva, 2016. "Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 547-586.
    5. Tirole, Jean, 1982. "On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1163-1181, September.
    6. Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, 2012. "Recent Research on the Economics of Patents," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 541-565, July.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Information and Competitive Price Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 246-253, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    2. Daske, Thomas, 2019. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: "Gamification" and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 193148, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    4. Ellingsen, Tore & Paltseva, Elena, 2012. "The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 658-669.
    5. Nicolas Schneider, 2022. "Internalizing Environmental Externalities and the Coase Theorem," World Journal of Applied Economics, WERI-World Economic Research Institute, vol. 8(2), pages 93-100, December.
    6. Andrés Abeliuk & Gerardo Berbeglia & Pascal Van Hentenryck, 2015. "Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-21, September.
    7. Paul A. Brehm & Eric Lewis, 2021. "Information asymmetry, trade, and drilling: evidence from an oil lease lottery," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 496-514, September.
    8. Alain‐Désiré Nimubona & Jean‐Christophe Pereau, 2022. "Negotiating over payments for wetland ecosystem services," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1507-1538, August.
    9. Deman, S., 2000. "The real estate takeover: Application of Grossman and Hart theory," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 175-195.
    10. Eric T. Anderson, 2002. "Sharing the Wealth: When Should Firms Treat Customers as Partners?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(8), pages 955-971, August.
    11. Ian Gale & Joseph Stiglitz, 1989. "A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient," NBER Working Papers 3209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kolmar, Martin, 1997. "Zur Effizienz nationaler Sozialversicherungssysteme in der Europäischen Union," Discussion Papers, Series II 341, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    13. Bård Harstad, 2012. "Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 77-115.
    14. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    15. Olsson, Ola, 2000. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Institutions," Working Papers in Economics 25, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    16. Yoon, Kiho, 2008. "The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 324-336, February.
    17. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, December.
    18. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    19. Marco Becht & Yuliya Kamisarenka & Anete Pajuste, 2018. "Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting - a Coasian bargain? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment," Working Papers ECARES 2018-10, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    20. Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 2015. "The Hedgehog and the Fox: From DSGE to Macro-Pru," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83, pages 31-55, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perfect competition; fundamental welfare theorems; learning; symmetric information; externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2021_002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mari Strønstad Øverås (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/souiono.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.