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Threshold Phenomena and Influence

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  • Gil Kalai
  • Muli Safra

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  • Gil Kalai & Muli Safra, 2005. "Threshold Phenomena and Influence," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000683, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000683
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
    2. Olle Haggstrom & Gil Kalai & Elchanan Mossel, 2004. "A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority," Discussion Paper Series dp363, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    4. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronen Gradwohl & Omer Reingold & Ariel Yadin & Amir Yehudayoff, 2009. "Players' Effects Under Limited Independence," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 971-980, November.

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