Inefficiencies in Bargaining: Departing from Akerlof and Myerson-Satterthwaite
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Cited by:
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008.
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- Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry, 2005. "Make Trade not War?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03415798, HAL.
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," Post-Print hal-03415798, HAL.
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03415798, HAL.
- Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Thoenig, Mathias, 2005. "Make trade not war ?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0515, CEPREMAP.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005.
"Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & moldovanu, benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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