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La gestion déléguée de l'eau : Les enjeux

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Michel Patry
  • Pierre J. Tremblay

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Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Michel Patry & Pierre J. Tremblay, 1999. "La gestion déléguée de l'eau : Les enjeux," CIRANO Project Reports 1999rp-11, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:1999rp-11
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/1999RP-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jouravlev, Andrei & Lee, Terence R., 1997. "Private participation in the provision of water services: alternative means for private participation in the provision of water services," Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo 5785, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Kessides, C., 1993. "Institutional Options for Provision of Infrastructure," World Bank - Discussion Papers 212, World Bank.
    3. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    5. Gisele Silva & Nicola Tynan & Yesim Yilmaz, 1998. "Private Participation in the Water and Sewerage Sector : Recent Trends," World Bank Publications - Reports 11540, The World Bank Group.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Boyer & Michel Patry & Pierre J. Tremblay, 2001. "La gestion déléguée de l'eau : Les options," CIRANO Project Reports 2001rp-10, CIRANO.
    2. Marcel Boyer & Michel Patry & Pierre J. Tremblay, 2001. "La gestion déléguée de l'eau : Gouvernance et rôle des différents intervenants," CIRANO Project Reports 2001rp-11, CIRANO.

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