IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ubs/wpaper/ubs0502.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Concession lenght and investment timing flexibility

Author

Listed:
  • Chiara D'Alpaos
  • Cesare Dosi
  • Michele Moretto

Abstract

When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces the issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is whether or not the concessionare should be allowed to set the timing of new invest- ments. In this paper we investigate the impact of concession length and investment timing ?exibility on the ?concession value?. It is generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they enable a concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option theory suggests that investment ?exibility has an in- trinsic value, as it allows concessionaires to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one may argue that long- term contracts, which allow for investment timing ?exibility, should always result in higher concession values. Our result suggests that this is not always the case. Firstly, investment ?exibility does not always increase the concession value. Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiara D'Alpaos & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2005. "Concession lenght and investment timing flexibility," Working Papers ubs0502, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0502
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.unibs.it/on-line/dse/Home/Inevidenza/PaperdelDipartimento/documento4573.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Littlechild Stephen, 2002. "Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, March.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1972. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 98-129, Spring.
    3. Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, 1986. "The Value of Waiting to Invest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 707-727.
    4. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    5. Michele Moretto & Chiara D’Alpaos, 2004. "The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A Real Option Analysis," Working Papers 2004.140, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. repec:bpj:rneart:v:1:y:2002:i:1:p:1-38 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Cox, John C. & Ross, Stephen A., 1976. "The valuation of options for alternative stochastic processes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 145-166.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    9. Harrison, J. Michael & Kreps, David M., 1979. "Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 381-408, June.
    10. Brennan, Michael J & Schwartz, Eduardo S, 1985. "Evaluating Natural Resource Investments," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 135-157, April.
    11. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    12. McDonald, Robert & Siegel, Daniel, 1984. "Option Pricing When the Underlying Asset Earns a Below-Equilibrium Rate of Return: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 261-265, March.
    13. Mauer, David C. & Ott, Steven H., 1995. "Investment under Uncertainty: The Case of Replacement Investment Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 581-605, December.
    14. McDonald, Robert L & Siegel, Daniel R, 1985. "Investment and the Valuation of Firms When There Is an Option to Shut Down," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(2), pages 331-349, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2006. "Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility," Conference Papers 6630, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    2. D'Alpaos, Chiara & Moretto, Michele & Valbonesi, Paola, 2006. "Time is Money: Optimal Investment Delay in Procurement (and Concession) Contracts," Conference Papers 6642, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    3. Pasquale L. Scandizzo & Marco Ventura, 2008. "A model of public and private partnership through concession contracts," ISAE Working Papers 104, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    4. Coco, Giuseppe & De Vincenti, Claudio, 2008. "Optimal price-cap reviews," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 238-244, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    2. Michele Moretto & Chiara D’Alpaos, 2004. "The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A Real Option Analysis," Working Papers 2004.140, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Sergio Vergalli & Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2009. ""It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts," Working Papers 2009.78, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Chiara D'Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2008. "Optimal penalty for investment delay in public procurement contracts," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0074, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    5. Lander, Diane M. & Pinches, George E., 1998. "Challenges to the Practical Implementation of Modeling and Valuing Real Options," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(3, Part 2), pages 537-567.
    6. Bardia Kamrad & Akhtar Siddique & Ricardo Ernst, 2012. "Partial equilibrium in risk‐based production decisions," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(1), pages 1-17, February.
    7. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2010. "Environmental Innovation, War Of Attrition And Investment Grants," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(01), pages 37-59.
    8. Joaquin, Domingo Castelo & Khanna, Naveen, 2001. "Investment timing decisions under threat of potential competition: Why firm size matters1," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-17.
    9. Olsen, Trond E. & Stensland, Gunnar, 1996. "On optimal control of income generating activities, and the value of flexible production design," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 349-361.
    10. Coggins, Jay S. & Ramezani, Cyrus A., 1998. "An Arbitrage-Free Approach to Quasi-Option Value," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 103-125, March.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1046 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Dimson, Elroy & Mussavian, Massoud, 1999. "Three centuries of asset pricing," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(12), pages 1745-1769, December.
    13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/9845 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Rainer Niemann & Caren Sureth, 2002. "Taxation under Uncertainty – Problems of Dynamic Programming and Contingent Claims Analysis in Real Option Theory," CESifo Working Paper Series 709, CESifo.
    15. Linnenluecke, Martina K. & Smith, Tom & McKnight, Brent, 2016. "Environmental finance: A research agenda for interdisciplinary finance research," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 124-130.
    16. Spiros H. Martzoukos & Nayia Pospori & Lenos Trigeorgis, 2024. "Corporate investment decisions with switch flexibility, constraints, and path-dependency," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 1223-1250, April.
    17. Antonio L. Lara Galera & Antonio Sánchez Soliño, 2010. "A Real Options Approach for the Valuation of Highway Concessions," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 416-427, August.
    18. Pindyck, Robert S, 1991. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-1148, September.
    19. Caren Sureth, 2002. "Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(2), pages 185-221, May.
    20. Coggins, Jay S. & Ramezani, Cyrus A., 1996. "AN ARBITRAGE-FREE APPROACH TO QUASI-OPTION VALUE; Proceedings of the Fifth Joint Conference on Agriculture, Food, and the Environment, June 17-18, 1996, Padova, Italy," Working Papers 14469, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    21. Schachter, J.A. & Mancarella, P., 2016. "A critical review of Real Options thinking for valuing investment flexibility in Smart Grids and low carbon energy systems," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 261-271.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Matteo Galizzi The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Matteo Galizzi to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/febreit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.