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Limits to competition in urban bus services in developing countries

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  • ANTONIO ESTACHE
  • ANDRÉS GÓMEZ‐LOBO

Abstract

During the past three decades, urban public transport policy has gone through several phases. From public ownership and monopoly provision, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a strong liberalization of the sector. This experience showed the limits of liberalization of the sector in terms of safety, prices and accountability. The paper discusses the market failures that justify this claim and the regulatory options available in this emerging new role of government. It illustrates how they are being used in practice in some countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & Andrés Gómez‐Lobo, 2004. "Limits to competition in urban bus services in developing countries," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 139-158, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:transr:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:139-158
    DOI: 10.1080/0144164042000289654
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhi-Chun Li & William Lam & S. Wong, 2012. "Optimization of Number of Operators and Allocation of New Lines in an Oligopolistic Transit Market," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.
    3. Manuel Martínez Espinal, 2017. "Transporte público de buses versus congestión y contaminación en Lima y Callao Reflexiones para la política sectorial de salud en Perú a partir de las Cuentas Nacionales de Salud," Revista Economía, Fondo Editorial - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, vol. 40(79), pages 47-86.
    4. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Joan Calzada, 2010. "Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona," IREA Working Papers 201009, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2010.
    5. Kenneth A. Small, 2007. "Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map," Working Papers 060724, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    6. Hensher, David A., 2007. "Sustainable public transport systems: Moving towards a value for money and network-based approach and away from blind commitment," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 98-102, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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