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Sovereign Defaults and Debt Sustainability: The Debt Recovery Channel

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Listed:
  • Ibrahima Diarra
  • Michel Guillard
  • Hubert Kempf

Abstract

This paper focuses on the debt recovery channel linking the dynamics of public debt to partial sovereign defaults. We build a simple model which incorporates sovereign default and a debt recovery rule. It depends on a parameter that allows for partial debt recovery. We show that the maximum debt-to-GDP ratio that a country can sustain without defaulting is increasing, nonlinear, and sensitive to the debt-recovery parameter. A higher debt recovery parameter increases the fiscal space but worsens the financial position of a borrowing country after a default episode. We show the empirical relevance of this channel for estimating country-specific fiscal spaces.

Suggested Citation

  • Ibrahima Diarra & Michel Guillard & Hubert Kempf, 2022. "Sovereign Defaults and Debt Sustainability: The Debt Recovery Channel," CESifo Working Paper Series 9688, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9688
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    References listed on IDEAS

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