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Interest alignment and firm performance

Author

Listed:
  • Gottschalg, Oliver
  • Meier, Degenhard

Abstract

This study derives testable hypotheses from their framework and thus provides an empirical test of interest alignment theory based on a sample of 69 management buyouts in the UK. The results of the multivariate regression model suggest that in this setting, interest alignment does have a significant influence on firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gottschalg, Oliver & Meier, Degenhard, 2005. "Interest alignment and firm performance," HEC Research Papers Series 825, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0825
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competitive advantage; interest alignment; motivation; buyouts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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