Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result
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More about this item
Keywords
mechanism design; limited commitment; revelation principle; informed-principal problem; persistence; correlated types;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2019-08-26 (Microeconomics)
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