IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_7782.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result

Author

Listed:
  • Suehyun Kwon

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result," CESifo Working Paper Series 7782, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7782
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7782.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2020. "Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    2. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2018. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2305-2334, August.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Johannes Hörner, 2018. "Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 871-925.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-1098, July.
    7. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    8. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    9. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7513, CESifo.
    10. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Thomas Tröger, 2014. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1668-1707.
    11. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    12. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-361, March.
    13. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    14. Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7513, CESifo.
    2. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    3. Noda, Shunya, 2019. "Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    4. Ando, Munetomo & Kobayashi, Hajime, 2008. "Intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 757-767, March.
    5. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    6. Bharant N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 2000. "Relationships, Competition, and the Structure of Investment Banking Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 96, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    7. Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    8. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 619-641, May.
    10. Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020. "Repeated delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    11. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    12. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    14. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
    16. Kimmo Berg & Gijs Schoenmakers, 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, November.
    17. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2011. "Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2356-2388.
    18. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 2106, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Abito, Jose Miguel & Chen, Cuicui, 2023. "A partial identification framework for dynamic games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    20. Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem," Post-Print hal-00543616, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mechanism design; limited commitment; revelation principle; informed-principal problem; persistence; correlated types;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7782. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.