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Matching on Bipartite Graphs

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach
  • Hans Haller

Abstract

We study stable matchings on exogenously given or endogenously formed bipartite graphs that reflect constraints on matching. The effects of a change of the exogenously given graph (constraints) are investigated. Specifically, we examine to what extent individuals gain or lose from relaxing restrictions on matching. Sabotage of particular matches or location choice can render certain matches infeasible and, therefore, lead to endogenous constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2015. "Matching on Bipartite Graphs," CESifo Working Paper Series 5575, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5575
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5575.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holzman, Ron & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 277-285.
    2. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Hans Haller, 2011. "An Analysis Of Advertising Wars," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 100-124, January.
    3. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    4. Gabrielle Demange & David Gale & Marilda Sotomayor, 1987. "A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem," Post-Print halshs-00670980, HAL.
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Schmutzler, Armin, 2014. "Does globalization create superstars? A simple theory of managerial wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 34-51.
    6. Friedman, Walter A., 1998. "John H. Patterson and the Sales Strategy of the National Cash Register Company, 1884 to 1922," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 552-584, January.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2022. "Gainers and losers from market integration," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 32-39.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching theory; networks; graphs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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