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Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change their Form of Governments?

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  • Bernd Hayo
  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

A country’s form of government has important economic and political consequences, but the determinants that lead countries to choose either parliamentary or presidential systems are largely unexplored. This paper studies this choice by analyzing the factors that make countries switch from parliamentary to presidential systems (or vice versa). The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the survival probability of the existing form of government (drawing on a proportional hazard model). In our model, which is based on 169 countries, we find that geographical factors and former colonial status are important determinants of survival probability. Also, presidential systems are, ceteris paribus, more likely to survive than parliamentary ones. Second, given that a change has taken place, we identify the underlying reasons based on panel data logit models. We find that domestic political factors are more important than economic ones. The most important factors relate to intermediate internal armed conflict, sectarian political participation, degree of democratization, and party competition, as well as the extent to which knowledge resources are distributed among the members of society.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2010. "Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change their Form of Governments?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3087, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3087
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    2. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2016. "Electoral competition and endogenous political institutions: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 43-61.
    3. Jan Fałkowski & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2015. "Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 79-105.
    4. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    5. Gutmann, Jerg & Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna & Voigt, Stefan, 2024. "Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    6. Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael, 2010. "Global Warming And Extreme Events: Rethinking The Timing And Intensity Of Environmental Policy," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-48, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    7. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2014. "Interest Groups and the “Rise and Decline” of Growth," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 435-456, October.
    8. Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Fondement historique de la qualité des institutions politiques : l’expérience parlementaire à l’indépendance," Working Papers hal-04141389, HAL.
    9. Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Economie constitutionnelle en Afrique: analyse empirique du changement de l’article sur la limitation de mandat des présidents," Working Papers hal-04141384, HAL.
    10. Eric Ip, 2015. "The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 307-327, September.
    11. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2016. "Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-13.
    12. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2021. "Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1569-1589, July.
    13. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 377-404, June.
    14. Lorenz Blume & Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2015. "Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201501, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    15. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2013. "Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-61.
    16. Goel, Rajeev K. & Nelson, Michael A., 2023. "Women’s political empowerment: Influence of women in legislative versus executive branches in the fight against corruption," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 139-159.
    17. Ammons, Joshua D., 2024. "Institutional effects of nonviolent and violent revolutions," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    18. Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Economie constitutionnelle en Afrique: analyse empirique du changement de l’article sur la limitation de mandat des présidents," EconomiX Working Papers 2015-33, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    19. Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 319-330.
    20. Marchand, Sébastien, 2016. "The colonial origins of deforestation: an institutional analysis," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 318-349, June.
    21. Richard McManus & F. Gulcin Ozkan, 2018. "Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 361-387, September.
    22. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2014. "Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 159-195, March.
    23. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2023. "Which political regimes foster entrepreneurship? An international examination," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 126-146, February.
    24. Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Fondement historique de la qualité des institutions politiques : l’expérience parlementaire à l’indépendance," EconomiX Working Papers 2015-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutional change; institutional dynamics; form of government; endogenous constitutions; separation of powers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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