Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna
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Keywords
ekonomia konstytucyjna; nowa ekonomia polityczna; konstytucja; ekonomiczna analiza prawa; endogeniczne instytucje;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
- P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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