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Militant Constitutionalism – A Promising Concept to Make Constitutional Backsliding less likely?

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  • Gutmann, Jerg
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to elude constitutional constraints or even to exploit constitutions in their favor. We make a number of proposals for designing constitutions that are more resilient against such attempts. A first look at the empirical evidence, however, is sobering. There is little evidence that many appealing constitutional rules are able to increase constitutional resilience.

Suggested Citation

  • Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2019. "Militant Constitutionalism – A Promising Concept to Make Constitutional Backsliding less likely?," ILE Working Paper Series 25, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:25
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Voigt, Stefan, 2020. "Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality," ILE Working Paper Series 32, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    3. Lars P. Feld & Daniel Nientiedt, 2023. "The Freiburg School and the Virginia School: introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 193-196, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutional compliance; militant democracy; militant constitutionalism; de jure de facto gap; democratic backsliding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K38 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Human Rights Law; Gender Law; Animal Rights Law
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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