Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
broadband internet; exposure problem; bundling; welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ICT-2024-05-13 (Information and Communication Technologies)
- NEP-URE-2024-05-13 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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