Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion
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More about this item
Keywords
Bayesian persuasion; strategic state pooling; preference misalignment; graph procedure;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2021-11-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-11-29 (Microeconomics)
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