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Optimal Severance Payment: Theory and Practice

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  • Byeongju Jeong

Abstract

I present a model in which the employment contract includes severance payment as an instrument for achieving optimal separation between the firm and the worker. I show that the privately optimal severance payment from the model can replicate the level and the variation in actual severance payments (and notice periods) across OECD countries. I conduct a policy experiment in which the existing unemployment benefits are financed by a separation tax. Under this policy, the actual severance payments need to change only marginally in order to achieve socially optimal separation.

Suggested Citation

  • Byeongju Jeong, 2005. "Optimal Severance Payment: Theory and Practice," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp255, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp255
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