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On higher hurdles for incumbents

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach

    (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich)

Abstract

The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2010. "On higher hurdles for incumbents," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 774-785.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00608
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I1-P72.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Philippe Muller & Oriol Tejada, 2015. "Costs of Change, Political Polarization, and Re-election Hurdles," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/222, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Francesco Caselli & Thomas E. Cunningham & Massimo Morelli & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds," NBER Working Papers 17833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2017. "Higher bars for incumbents and experience," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 492-513, July.
    4. Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham & Massimo Morelli & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules," CEP Discussion Papers dp1122, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol & Muller, Philippe, 2016. "The Effects of Higher Re-election Hurdles and Costs of Policy Change on Political Polarization," CEPR Discussion Papers 11375, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Third JEL Category: H4;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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