Stability of tacit collusion agreements in the Latin American inflationary environment
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More about this item
Keywords
Brazil; inflationary uncertainty; collusion; Real Plan;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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