Vertical integration in Mexican community forestry
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Cited by:
- Antinori, Camille & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003.
"Does Community Involvement Matter? How Collective Choice Affects Forests in Mexico,"
CUDARE Working Papers
25076, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Antinori, Camille M. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Does Community Involvement Matter? How Collective Choice Affects Forests in Mexico," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt83j385n0, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
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Keywords
community development; forestry; human capital; labor productivity; property rights; risk; vertical integration; Social and Behavioral Sciences;All these keywords.
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