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Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium

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  • Martine Quinzii
  • Michael Magill

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond''s model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.

Suggested Citation

  • Martine Quinzii & Michael Magill, 2003. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 3, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-20, February.
    2. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2000. "Decentralizing Incentive Efficient Allocations of Economies with Adverse Selection," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0855, Econometric Society.
    2. Guido Ruta & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Equilibrium corporate finance," 2009 Meeting Papers 149, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Peter Bossaerts & Caroline Fohlin, 2000. "Universal Banking and the Pricing of Securities Risk: Historical Evidence from Germany," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1596, Econometric Society.
    4. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "The effects of moral hazard on asset prices when financial markets are complete," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-56, February.
    5. Sunanda Roy, 2000. "Risk Sharing through Labor Contracts - Risk Aversion, Market Incompleteness and Employment," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1767, Econometric Society.

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