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Measuring Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 'Bundles Approach'

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  • Gerhard Schnyder

Abstract

This paper reviews recent studies that analyse and criticise existing academic and commercial corporate governance (CG) indices. Most of these 'rating the ratings' papers reach the conclusion that encompassing composite measures of CG are ineffective and suggest therefore to return to simpler measures. This paper draws on the 'configurational-' or 'bundles approach' to CG and argues that, while the criticisms made by the 'rating the ratings' papers are justified, their recommendations are misguided. Based on four central insights derived from the 'bundles approach', the paper shows that reverting to simpler measures of firm-level CG practices is a step in the wrong direction, in that it eliminates information about interactions between different corporate governance mechanisms. This is particularly consequential for comparative CG research that aims to identify differences in country-specific CG systems. Alternative solutions are developed to improve corporate governance measures, which take into account insights from the 'bundles approach'.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Schnyder, 2012. "Measuring Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 'Bundles Approach'," Working Papers wp438, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp438
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    File URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cbrwp438/
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    Cited by:

    1. Deakin, Simon & Sarkar, Prabirjit & Siems, Mathias, 2018. "Is There a Relationship Between Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development?," Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, now publishers, vol. 3(1), pages 115-146, May.
    2. Supriya Banerjee & Mike F. Wahl, 2017. "Values Based Ideal Types of Corporate Governance Systems," Journal of Business, LAR Center Press, vol. 2(1), pages 13-25, January.
    3. Cucinelli, Doriana & Soana, Maria Gaia, 2023. "Systemic risk in non financial companies: Does governance matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; bundles; corporate governance ratings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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