IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/lrc/larjob/v2y2017i1p13-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Values Based Ideal Types of Corporate Governance Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Supriya Banerjee

    (School of Business and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology (TTÜ), Tallinn, Estonia)

  • Mike F. Wahl

    (School of Business and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology (TTÜ), Tallinn, Estonia)

Abstract

Values and differences in corporate governance across the world are part and partially related and it is obvious that owners know what results they want to have from the corporations in the long run. In this regard, some scientific studies have revealed that owners would be succeed in a dynamic environment only if they formulate ownership strategy based on values. Consequently, to understand corporate governance better, some research has been carried out on corporate governance by relating values towards the area of knowledge but there is a scarcity of research which proposing comprehensive and explains corporate governance systems consisting values. Therefore, authors of this paper identified the following research problem which is: “Lacking of theory behind corporate governance systems including values which gives an opportunity towards the owners under different corporate governance systems to analyse its own behaviour, learning, managing knowledge, and finally clearly expressing ownership will in the form of an ownership strategy.” There were two data set was analysed in this study. One is Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) company law and corporate governance database based on member countries submission and the second set of data is Schwartz’s value survey to characterise multiple countries by their culture. Methodologically, after using multi quantitative tools this study is valuable to analyse all the secondary data to produce new knowledge, adopting different theoretical lens, by analysing and understanding the interrelationships of values and different systems of corporate governance across the world. The result of the study comes with a typology including values based three ideal types (Affective type, Cognitive type and Conative type) of corporate governance systems, with a practical contribution towards enriching the available knowledge for owners to formulate ownership strategy. Considering future direction, the constructed typology is required for assessment of the capability of refutation aside from OECD countries. Classification JEL: C30, G32, G34, M10

Suggested Citation

  • Supriya Banerjee & Mike F. Wahl, 2017. "Values Based Ideal Types of Corporate Governance Systems," Journal of Business, LAR Center Press, vol. 2(1), pages 13-25, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:lrc:larjob:v:2:y:2017:i:1:p:13-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.journalofbusiness.us/index.php/site/article/view/59/26
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Licht, Amir N. & Goldschmidt, Chanan & Schwartz, Shalom H., 2005. "Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-255, June.
    4. Mike Franz Wahl, 2012. "Ownership Typology: Four Basic Human Values & Will Based Ideal Types," Research in Economics and Business: Central and Eastern Europe, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, vol. 4(2).
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    6. Roe, Mark J., 2006. "Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199205301.
    7. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
    8. Humphry Hung, 1998. "A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 101-111, April.
    9. Mike Franz Wahl, 2015. "Strategic Audit and Ownership Strategy," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 5(9), pages 93-100, September.
    10. Mike Franz Wahl, 2015. "Strategic Audit and Ownership Strategy," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 5(9), pages 93-100, September.
    11. Gerhard Schnyder, 2012. "Measuring Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 'Bundles Approach'," Working Papers wp438, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    12. Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, 1997. "European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve-Country Study," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 28(4), pages 759-778, December.
    13. Annabelle Jaouen & Frank Lasch, 2015. "A new typology of micro-firm owner-managers," Post-Print hal-02011095, HAL.
    14. Tausch, Arno, 2015. "Hofstede, Inglehart and beyond. New directions in empirical global value research," MPRA Paper 64282, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 May 2015.
    15. Martin Hilb, 2016. "New Corporate Governance," Management for Professionals, Springer, edition 5, number 978-3-662-49060-0, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Otten, J.A. & Heugens, P.P.M.A.R., 2007. "Extending the Managerial Power Theory of Executive Pay: A Cross National Test," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2007-090-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    2. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    3. Ding, Wenzhi & Levine, Ross & Lin, Chen & Xie, Wensi, 2021. "Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 802-830.
    4. Matoussi, Hamadi & Jardak, Maha Khemakhem, 2012. "International Corporate Governance and Finance: Legal, Cultural and Political Explanations," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-43.
    5. Weiß, Christian, 2010. "The Ownership Concentration of Firms: Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 30247, September.
    6. Jorge Andrés Munoz Mendoza & Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo & Carmen Lissette Veloso Ramos, 2018. "Effects of Corporate Policies and Governance Practices on Ownership Structure: Evidence from Chilean Firms," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 10(2), pages 269-286, November.
    7. Christian Weiss & Stefan Hilger, 2012. "Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(4), pages 727-752, November.
    8. Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000. "The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 7587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The law and economics of self-dealing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
    10. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    11. Crama, Y. & Leruth, L. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Urbain, J-P., 1999. "Corporate Governance Structures, Control and Performance in European Markets : A Tale of Two Systems," Discussion Paper 1999-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Mike Peng & Yi Jiang, 2006. "Family Ownership And Control In Large Firms: The Good, The Bad, The Irrelevant ??? And Why," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp840, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    13. Chakrabarty, Subrata, 2009. "The influence of national culture and institutional voids on family ownership of large firms: A country level empirical study," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 32-45, March.
    14. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Governance: Who controls matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-053, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    15. Almaskati, Nawaf & Bird, Ron & Lu, Yue, 2020. "Corporate governance, institutions, markets, and social factors," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    16. Filippo Belloc, 2014. "Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(3), pages 821-848.
    17. John, Kose & Freund, Steven & Nguyen, Duong & Vasudevan, Gopala K., 2010. "Investor protection and cross-border acquisitions of private and public targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 259-275, June.
    18. Kusnadi, Yuanto & Wei, K.C. John, 2011. "The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 725-740, June.
    19. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    20. Howard Bodenhorn, 2011. "Partnership fragility and credit costs," NBER Working Papers 16689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance systems; induction; ideal type; typology; values.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lrc:larjob:v:2:y:2017:i:1:p:13-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: R Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journalofbusiness.us .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.