IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cbi/wpaper/10-rt-12.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sovereign default and macroeconomic tipping points

Author

Listed:
  • Joy, Mark

    (Central Bank of Ireland)

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals on the probability of sovereign default and the probability of exit from default while allowing explicitly for model uncertainty. Model uncertainty is addressed by employing Bayesian model-averaging techniques, averaging over a very large number of different empirical models that each endeavour to explain entry to and exit from periods of sovereign default for defaulting countries over the period 1975 to 2010. Default probabilities are estimated and then used to price sovereign bond spreads. Key findings are: (i) large budget deficits and high interest payments on external debt represent key macroeconomic tipping points for sovereign default; (ii) for exiting periods of default, reducing public debt matters most. These results are robust to both narrow and wide definitions of sovereign default and, due to use of model-averaging techniques, robust to model uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Joy, Mark, 2012. "Sovereign default and macroeconomic tipping points," Research Technical Papers 10/RT/12, Central Bank of Ireland.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbi:wpaper:10/rt/12
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/research-technical-papers/10rt12---sovereign-default-and-macroeconomic-tipping-points-(-mark-joy).pdf?sfvrsn=2
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 244-273, October.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    3. Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008. "Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
    4. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2007. "Do Countries Default in "Bad Times" ?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 352-360, 04-05.
    5. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    6. Arellano, Cristina & Kocherlakota, Narayana, 2014. "Internal debt crises and sovereign defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 68-80.
    7. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    8. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2007. "Optimal external debt and default," CEPR Discussion Papers 6035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    10. Nathan Foley-Fisher, 2012. "The timing of sovereign defaults over electoral terms," International Finance Discussion Papers 1047, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 16(2), pages 151-170, August.
    12. Aart Kraay & Vikram Nehru, 2006. "When Is External Debt Sustainable?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365.
    13. Mr. Bennett W Sutton & Mr. Luis Catão, 2002. "Sovereign Defaults: The Role of Volatility," IMF Working Papers 2002/149, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Carmen Fernandez & Eduardo Ley & Mark F. J. Steel, 2001. "Model uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(5), pages 563-576.
    15. Manasse, Paolo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2009. ""Rules of thumb" for sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 192-205, July.
    16. Enrique G. Mendoza & Vivian Z. Yue, 2012. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 889-946.
    17. Natalia Kovrijnykh & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Equilibrium Default Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 403-446.
    18. Jens Hilscher & Yves Nosbusch, 2010. "Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fundamentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(2), pages 235-262.
    19. Enrica Detragiache, 1996. "Rational Liquidity Crises in the Sovereign Debt Market: In Search of a Theory," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(3), pages 545-570, September.
    20. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "Serial Default and the "Paradox" of Rich-to-Poor Capital Flows," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 53-58, May.
    21. Mr. Axel Schimmelpfennig & Nouriel Roubini & Paolo Manasse, 2003. "Predicting Sovereign Debt Crises," IMF Working Papers 2003/221, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Chui, Michael & Gai, Prasanna & Haldane, Andrew G., 2002. "Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 519-546, March.
    23. Bandiera, Luca & Cuaresma, Jesus Crespo & Vincelette, Gallina A., 2010. "Unpleasant surprises : sovereign default determinants and prospects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5401, The World Bank.
    24. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    25. Shumway, Tyler, 2001. "Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 101-124, January.
    26. Ms. Enrica Detragiache & Mr. Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Crises and Liquidity: Evidence and Interpretation," IMF Working Papers 2001/002, International Monetary Fund.
    27. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    28. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, 2013. "Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 85-117, July.
    29. Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mr. Federico Sturzenegger, 2005. "Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005," IMF Working Papers 2005/137, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Avdjiev, Stefan & Binder, Stephan & Sousa, Ricardo, 2021. "External debt composition and domestic credit cycles," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    2. Mauro Costantini & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2020. "Consumption, asset wealth, equity premium, term spread, and flight to quality," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(3), pages 778-807, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Karatas, B., 2014. "Financial crisis and monetary policy," Other publications TiSEM 41e463f0-e122-4379-8db5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Karataş, Bilge, 2023. "Three sisters: The interlinkage between sovereign debt, currency, and banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    3. Silvia Marchesi, 2016. "Life after default? Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings," Development Working Papers 398, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 26 Aug 2016.
    4. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default," Working Papers 423, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2019.
    5. Reinhart, Carmen & Trebesch, Christoph, 2014. "A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief," CEPR Discussion Papers 10195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    7. Marchesi, Silvia & Masi, Tania, 2021. "Life after default. Private and official deals," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    8. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    9. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2013. "Sovereign Debt: A Review," NBER Working Papers 19388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Josefin Meyer & Carmen M Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1615-1680.
    11. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 215-251.
    12. Ghulam, Yaseen & Derber, Julian, 2018. "Determinants of sovereign defaults," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-55.
    13. Silvia, Marchesi, 2015. "The cost of default: private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings," Working Papers 320, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 28 Dec 2015.
    14. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, 2013. "Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 85-117, July.
    15. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
    16. Sebastian Edwards & Francis A. Longstaff & Alvaro Garcia Marin, 2015. "The U.S. Debt Restructuring of 1933: Consequences and Lessons," NBER Working Papers 21694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Horn, Fabian, 2015. "Quantifying the costs of sovereign defaults using odious debt cases as a quasi-natural experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113125, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    19. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Jean-Marc Fournier & Manuel Bétin, 2018. "Sovereign defaults: Evidence on the importance of government effectiveness," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1494, OECD Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign default; risk; model uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cbi:wpaper:10/rt/12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fiona Farrelly (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbigvie.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.