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Political Parties in Canada: What Determines Their Entry, Exit and the Duration of Their Lives?

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Abstract

In this paper we consider two margins of individual political party life in Canada since Confederation—the extensive margin governing existence (the entry and exit decisions together with party turnover or churning) and the intensive margin determining lifespan or survival length. The results confirm in a more formal way many of the individual hypotheses advanced in the political literature for entry and exit—the importance of voter heterogeneity, minority governments, world wars, number of competitors and, to a lesser degree, economic circumstance. What stands out most strongly in the data is the introduction of public funding for established political parties following 1974 and immigration flows. The intensive margin is analyzed using a number of hazard models before focusing on semi-parametric models. These best capture the form of the empirical hazard and in the discrete form allows for the detection of party type heterogeneity. The results suggest presence of two distinct political party types in and, more generally, mirror those found for the entry/exit decision. The public funding and immigration flows variables again stand out as being particularly significant.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Stephen Ferris & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2015. "Political Parties in Canada: What Determines Their Entry, Exit and the Duration of Their Lives?," Carleton Economic Papers 15-08, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 04 Apr 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:15-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Cao, Dan, 2015. "Innovation by entrants and incumbents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 255-294.
    2. Mark Doms & Eric J. Bartelsman, 2000. "Understanding Productivity: Lessons from Longitudinal Microdata," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 569-594, September.
    3. Stephen Ferris & Marcel Voia, 2008. "What determines the length of a typical Canadian parliamentary government?," Carleton Economic Papers 08-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2009.
    4. Marcel-Cristian Voia & J. Stephen Ferris, 2011. "Do Canadian Business Cycle Peaks Predict Federal Election Calls?," Carleton Economic Papers 11-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 07 May 2012.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2023. "On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 1-35, March.
    2. J. Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer & Derek Olmstead, 2018. "A Dynamic Model of Political Party Equilibrium: The Evolution of ENP in Canada, 1870–2015," Carleton Economic Papers 18-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2019.
    3. J. Stephen Ferris, 2020. "What happens when voting rules change? the case of New Zealand," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 267-291, September.
    4. J Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "Political Competitiveness and Fiscal Structure: A Time Series Analysis. Canada, 1870 - 2015," CESifo Working Paper Series 7220, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models

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