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On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018

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  • J. Stephen Ferris

    (Carleton University)

  • Bharatee Bhusana Dash

    (XIM University)

Abstract

We develop and test an equilibrium model of party structure to account for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections. The analysis finds that the number of parties increases with the voting density of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income and literacy levels, falls with average age while responding to a set of constitutional and legislative rules designed to affect party and electoral performance. The model is also applied to entry and exit, allowing the empirics to highlight those factors that affect party turnover rather than aggregate party numbers. The model explains better the number of parties than ENP, the effective (vote share weighted) number of parties, implying that the variability in the fringe of smaller parties has not substantially affected the vote shares received by the larger more established parties. Affirmative action, primarily in the form of increases in the proportion of seats reserved for members of special castes is associated with a reduction in both party numbers and ENP consistent with speeding the integration of scheduled castes into broader based political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2023. "On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 1-35, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09358-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09358-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarkar, Sandip & Dash, Bharatee Bhusana, 2023. "On the measurement of electoral volatility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 119-128.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Number of political parties; ENP; Indian states; Entry and exit of political parties; BIMAROU and Non-BIMAROU states; Fixed effects Poisson panel estimation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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