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Default, Inflation Expectations, and the Currency Denomination of Sovereign Bonds

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  • Maeng, F. S.

Abstract

The share of debt denominated in domestic national currency issued by emerging economies has been rising sharply over time—progress away from the “original sin†of invoicing sovereign debt in foreign currencies. Yet this progress has been partial and subject to fluctuations. This paper develops a New Keynesian model with sovereign default where the government can manipulate expected inflation through debt issuance and default policies. High levels of national currency debt incentivize governments to reduce debt repayment by escalating (expected) inflation. Governments tilt the currency denomination of debt towards foreign currency to avoid distortions from escalating (expected) inflation, at the cost of giving up hedging consumption fluctuations of national currency debt. The model highlights default risk as a key factor driving a higher share of debt in foreign currency when expected inflation rises—a pattern observed in inflation-targeting emerging economies. Quantitatively, default risk explains up to 37 percentage points of the share of debt in foreign currency. Optimal debt management contains inflation, default frequency, and spreads.

Suggested Citation

  • Maeng, F. S., 2024. "Default, Inflation Expectations, and the Currency Denomination of Sovereign Bonds," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2438, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2438
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Default; Inflation; Currency Denomination; New Keynesian Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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