Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games
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Cited by:
- Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2009.
"Switching costs in infinitely repeated games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 292-314, May.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-021, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Paper 1032, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Caillaud, B. & Cohen, D., 2000. "Inter-generational transfers and common values in a society," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1091-1103, May.
- Stähler, Frank & Wagner, Friedrich, 1998. "Cooperation in a resource extraction game," Kiel Working Papers 846, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Boyer, Marcel & Lasserre, Pierre & Moreaux, Michel, 2012.
"A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 663-681.
- Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Moreaux, 2011. "A Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game without Commitment under Uncertain Market Expansion," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-65, CIRANO.
- Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008.
"Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
- Nori Tarui & Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky & Greg Ellis, 2007. "Cooperation in the Commons with Unobservable Actions," Working Papers 200711, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Gardner Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without Markets," Working Papers 0025, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2000.
"Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August.
- Lipman, Barton & Wang, Ruqu, 1997. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273389, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 1997. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1190, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gardner M. Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use without Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 875-914, December.
- Salo, Seppo & Tahvonen, Olli, 2001. "Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 671-702, May.
- Anabela Botelho & Ariel Dinar & Lígia Costa Pinto & Amnon Rapoport, 2014.
"Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 649-672, December.
- Anabela Botelho & Ariel Dinar & Lígia Costa Pinto & Amnon Rapoport, 2012. "Time and Uncertainty in Resource Dilemmas: Equilibrium Solutions and Experimental Results," NIMA Working Papers 47, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
- Tarui, Nori, 2007. "Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 214-239, May.
- Stähler, Frank, 1996. "Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games," Kiel Working Papers 760, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Stähler, Frank, 1998. "Competitiveness and environmental policies in a dynamic model," Kiel Working Papers 859, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Tarui, Nori, 2004. "Common-Property Resource Use And Outside Options: Cooperation Across Generations In A Dynamic Game," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20029, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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