Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity
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Keywords
Objective Ambiguity; Ambiguity Aversion; Finitely Repeated Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Ellsberg Urns; Ellsberg Strategies;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2019-02-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2019-02-04 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2019-02-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2019-02-04 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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