Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
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Cited by:
- William N. Caballero & Brian J. Lunday & Darryl K. Ahner, 2020. "Incentive Compatible Cost Sharing of a Coalition Initiative with Probabilistic Inspection and Penalties for Misrepresentation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1021-1055, December.
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021.
"Signaling versus Auditing,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
- Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018. "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7183, CESifo.
- Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 286, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Li, Yunan & Zhang, Xingtan, 2024. "Collective decision through an informed mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
- Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
probabilistic verification; testing; revelation principle; ordering tests; evidence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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