Sharing, Gift-Giving, and Optimal Resource Use Incentives in Hunter-Gatherer Society
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Cited by:
- L. Bagnoli & G. Negroni, 2012. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Working Papers wp858, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Giorgio Negroni & Lidia Bagnoli, 2017. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(3), pages 635-667, October.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2004-06-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
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