Time Consistency in Games of Timing
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- Luca Lambertini, 1997. "Time Consistency in Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 97-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Giulio ECCHIA & Luca LAMBERTINI, 2001. "Endogenous Timing and Quality Standards in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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