IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v69y2010i2p317-326.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A linear generalization of Stackelberg’s model

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Lafay

Abstract

We study an extension of Stackelberg's model in which many firms can produce at many different times. Demand is affine while cost is linear. In this setting, we investigate whether Stackelberg's results in a two-firm game are robust when the number of firms increases. We show that: firms may not need to anticipate further entries, leaders might earn less than in the simultaneous game and, whatever its cost and its time of entry, the firm's entry always improves welfare.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Lafay, 2010. "A linear generalization of Stackelberg’s model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 317-326, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:317-326
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9126-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-008-9126-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-008-9126-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Albaek, Svend, 1990. "Stackelberg Leadership as a Natural Solution under Cost Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 335-347, March.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
    3. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
    4. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
    5. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer.
    6. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 217-230, December.
    7. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Sequential entry, industry structure and welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1671-1687, October.
    8. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2021. "Stackelberg Independence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 214-238, March.
    2. Ludovic Julien & Olivier Musy & Aurélien Saïdi, 2012. "On hierarchical competition in oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 217-237, November.
    3. Bersani, Alberto M. & Falbo, Paolo & Mastroeni, Loretta, 2022. "Is the ETS an effective environmental policy? Undesired interaction between energy-mix, fuel-switch and electricity prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    4. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2011. "Strategic behavior under partial cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 175-193, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Yousefimanesh, Niloofar & Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 529-555.
    3. Amir, Rabah & Grilo, Isabel, 1999. "Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    4. Luca Lambertini, 2000. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 47(5), pages 550-570, November.
    5. L. Lambertini, 1997. "Time Consistency in Games of Timing," Working Papers 302, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    6. Miguel Cantillo, 2023. "Imperfect bank competition, borrower adverse selection, and the transmission of monetary policy," Working Papers 202301, Universidad de Costa Rica, revised Mar 2023.
    7. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2019. "Stackelberg versus Cournot: A differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 239-261.
    8. Luciano Fanti, 2016. "Endogenous timing under price competition and unions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 401-413, December.
    9. Giulio ECCHIA & Luca LAMBERTINI, 2001. "Endogenous Timing and Quality Standards in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    10. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
    11. Attila Tasnádi, 2016. "Endogenous timing of moves in Bertrand–Edgeworth triopolies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 317-334, December.
    12. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
    13. Tamás Balogh & Attila Tasnádi, 2012. "Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 233-249, July.
    14. Daw Ma, 2014. "Can Emerging Market Protectionism Be Beneficial?," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 4(9), pages 1175-1189, September.
    15. Chao, Yong & Tan, Guofu & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2019. "Asymmetry in capacity and the adoption of all-units discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 152-172.
    16. L. Lambertini & S. Poddar & D. Sasaki, 1998. "Price versus Quantity Competition with Cost Sharing," Working Papers 343, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    17. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2018. "Endogenous timing when a vertically integrated producer supplies a rival," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, October.
    18. Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca, 2018. "Choosing roles under supply function competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 83-88.
    19. Daniel Cracau & Benjamin Franz, 2013. "Judo Economics in Markets with Multiple Firms," FEMM Working Papers 130013, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    20. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Chatterjee, Ishita, 2014. "Exploring Stackelberg profit ordering under asymmetric product differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 309-315.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot competition; Stackelberg; Preemption; C72; D43; L11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:317-326. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.