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US Barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross Border Hedge Fund Activism

Author

Listed:
  • Konari Uchida

    (The University of Kitakyushu)

  • Peng Xu

    (Hosei University)

Abstract

We investigate causes and consequences of the emerging shareholder hostility in Japan. Steel Partners, an activist hedge fund based in San Francisco, takes big stakes in more than 30 Japanese firmsand pushes for strategic changes and sometimes tries to gain control of whole businesses. Meanwhile, Murakami Fund, a fresh Japanese activist fund, targets more than 40 firms. Steel Partner's targets typically have more cash but lower market valuations, whereas Murakami Fund is more likely to target cash-rich firms only. Targets exhibit abnormal returns of about 5% around the announcement of activist investors taking large stakes. And the stock market responses more favorably when targets have more cash and lower market valuations. In addition, the stock market seems to evaluate Steel Partner's track record to create shareholder values. Finally, the targets' long-term stock return does not revert to negative values.

Suggested Citation

  • Konari Uchida & Peng Xu, 2008. "US Barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross Border Hedge Fund Activism," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 08-E-3, Bank of Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:boj:bojwps:08-e-3
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    File URL: http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/wps_2008/data/wp08e03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tinaikar, Surjit, 2017. "Executive compensation disclosure and private control benefits: A comparison of U.S. and Canadian dual class firms," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 32-51.
    2. Maffett, Mark & Nakhmurina, Anya & Skinner, Douglas J., 2022. "Importing activists: Determinants and consequences of increased cross-border shareholder activism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2).
    3. Lee, Bong Soo & Suh, Jungwon, 2011. "Cash holdings and share repurchases: International evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1306-1329.
    4. Hiroaki Miyachi & Fumiko Takeda, 2021. "Hedge Fund Activism in Japan under the Stewardship and Corporate Governance Codes," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(2), pages 119-130, May.
    5. Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga & Nishikawa, Takeshi, 2023. "Heterogeneity in shareholder activism: Evidence from Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    6. Guoli Chen & Philipp Meyer‐Doyle & Wei Shi, 2021. "Hedge fund investor activism and human capital loss," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(12), pages 2328-2354, December.
    7. KUBO Katsuyuki & TSUBONO Kodai, 2022. "The Effect of Investment Funds on Employment and Wages," Discussion papers 22044, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    8. Yeh, Tsung-ming, 2017. "Determinants and consequences of shareholder proposals: The cases of board election, charter amendment, and profit disposal," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 245-261.
    9. Tong, Jiao & Bremer, Marc, 2016. "Stock repurchases in Japan: A solution to excessive corporate saving?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 41-56.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Activist Fund; Shareholder Hostility; Free Cash Flow; Corporate Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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