IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/813.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Terms of Endearment: An Equilibrium Model Of Sex and Matching

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Arcidiacono

    (Duke University)

  • Andrew Beauchamp

    (Boston College)

  • Marjorie McElroy

    (Duke University)

Abstract

We develop a directed search model of relationship formation which can disentangle male and female preferences for types of partners and for different relationship terms using only a cross-section of observed matches. Individuals direct their search to a particular type of match on the basis of (i) the terms of the relationship, (ii) the type of partner, and (iii) the endogenously determined probability of matching. If men outnumber women, they tend to trade a low probability of a preferred match for a high probability of a less-preferred match; the analogous statement holds for women. Using data from National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health we estimate the equilibrium matching model with high school relationships. Variation in gender ratios is used to uncover male and female preferences. Estimates from the structural model match subjective data on whether sex would occur in one's ideal relationship. The equilibrium result shows that some women would ideally not have sex, but do so out of matching concerns; the reverse is true for men.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Arcidiacono & Andrew Beauchamp & Marjorie McElroy, 2012. "Terms of Endearment: An Equilibrium Model Of Sex and Matching," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 813, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 02 Jul 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:813
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp813.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    2. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    3. Audra J. Bowlus & Zvi Eckstein, 2002. "Discrimination and Skill Differences in an Equilibrium Search Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1309-1345, November.
    4. Linda Y. Wong, 2003. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(3), pages 699-728, July.
    5. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 133-156, Fall.
    6. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
    7. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627, Elsevier.
    8. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    9. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-157, July.
    10. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2009. "The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 190-225, August.
    11. Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.
    12. Zhenchao Qian, 1997. "Breaking the racial barriers: Variations in interracial marriage between 1980 and 1990," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 34(2), pages 263-276, May.
    13. Weiss, Yoram, 1993. "The formation and dissolution of families: Why marry? Who marries whom? And what happens upon divorce," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 81-123, Elsevier.
    14. Josh Angrist, 2002. "How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 997-1038.
    15. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    16. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
    17. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2567-2627 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Robert J. Willis, 1999. "A Theory of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 33-64, December.
    19. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-329, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Teen sex: are female droping scrupules due to the lack of men?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-01-08 21:51:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Seth Richards‐Shubik, 2015. "Peer effects in sexual initiation: Separating demand and supply mechanisms," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), pages 663-702, November.
    2. Ingela Alger & Donald Cox, 2013. "The evolution of altruistic preferences: mothers versus fathers," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 421-446, September.
    3. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon & Sonia Jaffe & Scott Duke Kominers, 2020. "Taxation In Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1591-1634, November.
    4. Kristen Harknett & Stephen Cranney, 2017. "Majority Rules: Gender Composition and Sexual Norms and Behavior in High Schools," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 36(4), pages 469-500, August.
    5. Andrew Beauchamp & Geoffrey Sanzenbacher & Shannon Seitz & Meghan Skira, 2014. "Deadbeat Dads," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 859, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Ong, David & Yang, Yu (Alan) & Zhang, Junsen, 2020. "Hard to get: The scarcity of women and the competition for high-income men in urban China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    7. Anja Sautmann, 2017. "Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 263-294, May.
    8. Shuya He & Charles N. Noussair, 2024. "Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 525-542, April.
    9. Marcel Fafchamps & Forhad Shilpi, 2014. "Education and Household Welfare," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 73-115.
    10. Rania Gihleb & Kevin Lang, 2020. "Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased," Research in Labor Economics, in: Change at Home, in the Labor Market, and On the Job, volume 48, pages 1-26, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    11. Anderberg, Dan & Bagger, Jesper & Bhaskar, V. & Wilson, Tanya, 2019. "Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability," IZA Discussion Papers 12210, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Qinyou Hu, 2024. "Social status and marriage markets: Evaluating a Hukou policy in China," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 477-509, June.
    13. Forsstrom, Matthew P., 2021. "Abortion Costs and Single Parenthood: A Life-Cycle Model of Fertility and Partnership Behavior," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-157, July.
    2. Benjamin Goldman & Jamie Gracie & Sonya R. Porter, 2024. "Who Marries Whom? The Role of Segregation by Race and Class," Working Papers 24-30, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    3. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, 2013. "Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 474-508.
    4. Augsburg, Britta & Baquero, Juan P. & Gautam, Sanghmitra & Rodriguez-Lesmes, Paul, 2023. "Sanitation and marriage markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    5. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    6. Kota Ogasawara & Mizuki Komura, 2022. "Consequences of war: Japan’s demographic transition and the marriage market," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 1037-1069, July.
    7. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2022. "Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(5), pages 2600-2629.
    8. Gavrilova, Evelina, 2019. "A partner in crime: Assortative matching and bias in the crime market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 598-612.
    9. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    10. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana, 2009. "Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Characteristics in the Marriage Market," Working Papers 2009-34, FEDEA.
    11. John Knowles & Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2019. "Fertility Shocks And Equilibrium Marriage‐Rate Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1505-1537, November.
    12. Hoehn-Velasco, Lauren & Penglase, Jacob, 2023. "Changes in assortative matching and educational inequality: evidence from marriage and birth records in Mexico," Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 587-607, December.
    13. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    14. Francesconi, Marco & Belot, Michèle, 2007. "Can anyone be ‘the’ one? Field evidence on dating behavior," ISER Working Paper Series 2007-17, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    15. Petra Persson, 2020. "Social Insurance and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 252-300.
    16. Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle, 2015. "Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 731-755, December.
    17. Nicola Barban & Elisabetta De Cao & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2016. "Assortative Mating on Education: A Genetic Assessment," Working Papers 2016-034, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    18. Soohyung Lee, 2008. "Preferences and Choice Constraints in Marital Sorting: Evidence From Korea," Discussion Papers 07-042, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    19. Marcassa, Stefania & Pouyet, Jérôme & Trégouët, Thomas, 2020. "Marriage strategy among the European nobility," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    20. Hani Mansour & Terra McKinnish, 2018. "Same-occupation spouses: preferences or search costs?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 1005-1033, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching; relationships; sex;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:813. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/debocus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.