Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching Theory; Housing Markets; Two-sided Matching; Roommates Problem; Kidney Exchange; House Allocation; Student Placement; Reserve Systems;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-05-13 (Economic Design)
- NEP-UPT-2024-05-13 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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