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Exchange-stability in roommate problems

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  • Azar Abizada

    (ADA University)

Abstract

We study one-sided matching problem, also known as roommate problem, where a group of people need to be paired in order to be assigned to certain rooms. We assume that number of rooms are limited and thus no one can be by himself. Each student has strict preferences over their roommates. Central notion in this problem is stability. We consider exchange-stability of Alcalde (Econ Des 1:275–287, 1995), which is immune to group of students exchanging their rooms/roommates with each other. He shows that exchange-stable matching may not always exist and considers specific domains of preferences to guarantee existence of such matching. We define more general domains of preferences on which exchange-stable matching is guaranteed to exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Azar Abizada, 2019. "Exchange-stability in roommate problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(1), pages 3-12, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:23:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-018-0217-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0217-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
    2. Jens Gudmundsson, 2014. "When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(2), pages 151-161, June.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    4. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
    5. Morrill, Thayer, 2010. "The roommates problem revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1739-1756, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2023. "Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 107-118.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Roommate problem; Exchange-stability; Iteratively mutually best;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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