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Constrained random matching

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  • Balbuzanov, Ivan

Abstract

This paper generalizes the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) to matching markets with arbitrary constraints. The constraints are modeled as a set of permissible ex post allocations. A result of independent interest gives a simple geometric characterization of all lotteries over the set of permissible allocations: they are the ones that satisfy a collection of simple and tractable linear inequalities determined by the constraints. The inequalities correspond to the hyperplanes defining a convex polytope that is intuitively constructed from the given set. When a general version of the PS algorithm is executed under these inequalities, the outcome is an efficient and fair lottery over the set of permissible allocations. The method is general, can be applied to both one-sided and two-sided matching markets, and allows for multi-unit demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:203:y:2022:i:c:s002205312200062x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105472
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Ping Zhan, 2023. "Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 45(5), pages 1-24, July.
    3. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2020. "The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints," Papers 2008.08991, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    4. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    5. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
    6. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constrained random assignment; Probabilistic serial mechanism; sd-efficiency; Fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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