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The Indoctrination Game

Author

Listed:
  • David Lagziel

    (BGU)

  • Lotem Ikan

    (BGU)

Abstract

The indoctrination game is a complete-information contest over public opinion. The players exert costly effort to manifest their private opinions in public in order to control the discussion, so that the governing opinion is similar to theirs. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for the silent majority and vocal minority phenomena, i.e., we show that all moderate opinions remain mute in equilibrium while allowing extremists full control of the discussion. Moreover, we prove that elevated exposure to others' opinions increases the observed polarization among individuals. Using these results, we formulate a new social-learning framework, referred to as an indoctrination process.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Lagziel & Lotem Ikan, 2023. "The Indoctrination Game," Working Papers 2304, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2304
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary processes; contest theory; non-Bayesian social learning; polarization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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