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Auctions with Interdependent Valuations

Author

Listed:
  • Funk, Peter

Abstract

This paper analyses auctions in which the valuation of each player not only depends on whether he wins or not, but also on who is the winner if it is not him.

Suggested Citation

  • Funk, Peter, 1996. "Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 51-64.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:51-64
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
    2. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 1-19, May.
    3. Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2014. "Entry by Takeover: Auctions vs. Negotiations," CSEF Working Papers 353, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "Extremism drives out moderation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 861-887, April.
    5. Dimitry Rtischev, 2009. "Licensing of a lower-cost production process to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly," Gakushuin Economic Papers, Gakushuin University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 325-336.
    6. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2021. "Overzealous Rule Makers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 341-365.
    7. Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 1999. "Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices," Working Paper Series 511, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 03 Dec 2001.
    8. David Lagziel & Lotem Ikan, 2023. "The Indoctrination Game," Working Papers 2304, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    9. Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022. "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers 2203, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    10. Page Jr., F.H., 1997. "Existence of Optimal Auctions in General Environments," Other publications TiSEM 258e7c42-1fc1-41d2-aafb-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
    12. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2021. "Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 103-116.
    13. Vishnu V. Narayan & Enguerrand Prebet & Adrian Vetta, 2019. "The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)," Papers 1905.00853, arXiv.org.

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