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Highway to Hitler

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  • Nico Voigtländer
  • Hans-Joachim Voth

Abstract

Can infrastructure investment win "hearts and minds"? We analyze a famous case in the early stages of dictatorship - the building of the motorway network in Nazi Germany. The Autobahn was one of the most important projects of the Hitler government. It was intended to reduce unemployment, and was widely used for propaganda purposes. We examine its role in increasing support for the NS regime by analyzing new data on motorway construction and the 1934 plebiscite, which gave Hitler greater powers as head of state. Our results suggest that road building was highly effective, reducing opposition to the nascent Nazi regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2014. "Highway to Hitler," Working Papers 769, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:769
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Palma, Nuno & Reis, Jaime, 2021. "Can autocracy promote literacy? Evidence from a cultural alignment success story," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 412-436.
    3. Roberto Bonfatti & Giovanni Facchini & Alexander Tarasov & Gian Luca Tedeschi & Cecilia Testa, 2021. "Pork, infrastructure and growth: Evidence from the Italian railway expansion," Discussion Papers 2021-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    4. Galofré-Vilà, Gregori & Meissner, Christopher M. & McKee, Martin & Stuckler, David, 2021. "Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 81-113, March.
    5. Carozzi, Felipe & Repetto, Luca, 2019. "Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain's Plan E," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 85-106.
    6. Lamberova, Natalia, 2021. "The puzzling politics of R&D: Signaling competence through risky projects," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 801-818.
    7. Cinnirella, Francesco & Schueler, Ruth, 2018. "Nation building: The role of central spending in education," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 18-39.
    8. Remi Jedwab & Noel D. Johnson & Mark Koyama, 2019. "Negative shocks and mass persecutions: evidence from the Black Death," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 345-395, December.
    9. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    10. Ou, Susan & Xiong, Heyu, 2021. "Mass persuasion and the ideological origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    11. Bierbrauer, Felix & Winkelmann, Justus, 2020. "All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Federico, Giovanni & Bisin, Alberto, 2021. "Merger or acquisition? An introduction to the Handbook of Historical economics," CEPR Discussion Papers 15795, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Akbulut-Yuksel, Mevlude & Okoye, Dozie & Turan, Belgi, 2020. "Expressway to Power: Infrastructure Projects and Political Support," IZA Discussion Papers 13795, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Bracco, E. & De Paola, M. & Green, C.P., 2015. "Long lasting differences in civic capital: Evidence from a unique immigration event in Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 160-173.
    15. Carillo, Mario Francesco, 2018. "Fascistville: Mussolini's New Towns and the Persistence of Neo-Fascism," MPRA Paper 96236, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Oct 2019.
    16. Belmonte, Alessandro, 2020. "State Capacity, Schooling, and Fascist Education: Evidence from the Reclamation of the Pontine Marshes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 528, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; infrastructure spending; establishment of dictatorships; pork-barrel politics; Nazi regime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N94 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: 1913-

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