All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104955
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Cited by:
- Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2021.
"Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 314-333, June.
- Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2020. "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 251, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Thiago Christiano Silva & Solange Maria Guerra & Marcus Vinicius B. Santos, 2022. "The role of externalities in fiscal efficiency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(6), pages 2827-2864, June.
- Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Public goods; Bundling; State capacity; Mechanism design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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