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Firing the Wrong Workers: Financing Constraints and Labor Misallocation

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Listed:
  • Daniel Metzger
  • Vicente Cuñat
  • Andrea Caggese

Abstract

Firms consider wages, current and expected productivity as well as firing and hiring costs when firing a worker. Financing constraints distort this intertemporal trade-off, leading firms to sub-optimally fire short-tenured workers with high future expected productivity. We provide empirical evidence of this distortion using matched employer-employee data from the Swedish population between 2000 and 2010. We propose a new empirical strategy that uses credit ratings to identify financing constraints and uses exchange rates and trade data to identify demand shocks. Our empirical results identify an important new misallocation effect of financial frictions that operates within firms across different types of workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Metzger & Vicente Cuñat & Andrea Caggese, 2018. "Firing the Wrong Workers: Financing Constraints and Labor Misallocation," Working Papers 1058, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Ren, Tao & Huang, Hai-Jun, 2020. "A competitive system with transit and highway: Revisiting the political feasibility of road pricing," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-56.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financing constraints; labor misallocation; firing decisions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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