IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bef/lsbest/011.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Monopolistic Credit Rating Agency

Author

Listed:
  • Anette Boom

Abstract

The paper analyses the demand for credit rating services of a continuum of firms. The firms differ in the probability of their investment's success which is private information. They can use the service of a monopolistic rating agency that sends an imperfect signal of their success probability to the capital market. The demand for rating services turns out to be not always monotonous in its price. If a rating agency exists, only rated firms obtain a credit. There can be oversupply or undersupply of rating services from a social planner's point of view.

Suggested Citation

  • Anette Boom, "undated". "A Monopolistic Credit Rating Agency," Papers 011, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/%7Elsbester/papers/rat6.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Melumad, Nd & Thoman, L, 1990. "On Auditors And The Courts In An Adverse Selection Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 77-120.
    2. Millon, Marcia H & Thakor, Anjan V, 1985. "Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1403-1422, December.
    3. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
    4. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
    5. Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 415-432.
    6. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland, 2002. "The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 393-412, May.
    2. Fischer, Thomas, 2015. "Market structure and rating strategies in credit rating markets – A dynamic model with matching of heterogeneous bond issuers and rating agencies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 39-56.
    3. Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2006. "Existence of Unsolicited Ratings," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 13(3), pages 207-233, September.
    4. Forster, Josef, 2008. "The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies," Discussion Papers in Economics 5169, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2004. "Moral Hazard with Rating Agency: An Incentive Contracting Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 313-333, November.
    6. Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0078 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yiquan Gu, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 0078, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matej Marinč, 2009. "Bank Monitoring and Role of Diversification," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 16(1), pages 77-91, May.
    2. Mustaruddin Mustaruddin & Aristya Dinata & Wendy Wendy & Anwar Azazi, 2017. "Asymmetric Information and Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Stock Exchange," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(6), pages 8-15.
    3. Kausar, Asad & Shroff, Nemit & White, Hal, 2016. "Real effects of the audit choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 157-181.
    4. Carletti, Elena & Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2007. "Multiple-bank lending: Diversification and free-riding in monitoring," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 425-451, July.
    5. Brunella Bruno & Emilia Garcia‐Appendini & Giacomo Nocera, 2018. "Experience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art Auctions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(4), pages 833-864, December.
    6. Michael Breuer, 2001. "Finanzintermediaere - Groessennachteile und Spezialisierungsvorteile," SOI - Working Papers 0103, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    7. Dosis, Anastasios, 2018. "On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
    8. Boot, A.W.A. & Thakor, A.V. & Udell, G.F., 1987. "Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments," Other publications TiSEM afd7b491-7ac6-41c8-8cae-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Babl, Christian & Fausel, Andreas & Kuhlman, Leonard & Schiereck, Dirk, 2014. "Werteffekte auf Anleiheemissionen: Eine Note für deutsche Emittenten," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(1), pages 8-22.
    10. Kilian Huber, 2021. "Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(7), pages 2023-2066.
    11. Ghulam Mujtaba Chaudhary & Shujahat Haider Hashmi & Aqeel Younis, 2016. "Does Dividend Announcement Generate Market Signal? Evidence from Pakistan," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(1), pages 65-72.
    12. Tripathy, Niranjan & Wu, Da & Zheng, Yi, 2021. "Dividends and financial health: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    13. Kang, Kee-Youn & Jang, Inkee, 2020. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Belief Update in Credit Markets," MPRA Paper 99071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Peterson, Steven P., 1996. "Some experimental evidence on the efficiency of dividend signaling in resolving information asymmetries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 373-388, May.
    15. Michael Minnis & Nemit Shroff, 2017. "Why regulate private firm disclosure and auditing?," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(5), pages 473-502, July.
    16. Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, 2006. "Opaqueness in the Insurance Industry: Why Are Some Insurers Harder to Evaluate than Others?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 149-163, September.
    17. David Feldman & Charles Trzcinka & Russell Winer, 2015. "Pricing under noisy signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 435-454, August.
    18. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia & Thakor, Anjan, 2018. "Warehouse banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 250-267.
    19. Jannik Gerwanski, 2020. "Does it pay off? Integrated reporting and cost of debt: European evidence," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(5), pages 2299-2319, September.
    20. Ricardo J. Rodriguez, 1992. "Quality Dispersion And The Feasibility Of Dividends As Signals," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(4), pages 307-315, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: XXX (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.