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Opaqueness in the Insurance Industry: Why Are Some Insurers Harder to Evaluate than Others?

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  • Steven W. Pottier
  • David W. Sommer

Abstract

Many articles have investigated various tools used to evaluate the financial strength of insurers. This is the first study to investigate whether certain insurers are simply inherently more difficult to evaluate than others, regardless of the tool used. The article identifies certain specific insurer characteristics that are associated with greater difficulty in financial strength evaluation, as proxied for by the level of rating disagreement by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Specifically, the empirical results indicate that insurers that exhibit the following characteristics are more difficult to assess in terms of financial strength: smaller insurers, stock insurers, insurers with a history of reserving errors, insurers that use less reinsurance, insurers with greater levels of investment in stocks and low‐grade bonds, and insurers that are more geographically diversified.

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  • Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, 2006. "Opaqueness in the Insurance Industry: Why Are Some Insurers Harder to Evaluate than Others?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 149-163, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:rmgtin:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:149-163
    DOI: j.1540-6296.2006.00091.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Selim Mankai & Aymen Belgacem, 2013. "Interactions Between Risk-Taking, Capital, and Reinsurance for Property-Liability Insurance Firms," Working Papers hal-04141190, HAL.
    2. Xin Che & Stephen G. Fier & Andre P. Liebenberg, 2019. "The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 329-358, September.
    3. Ben Ammar, Semir & Eling, Martin & Milidonis, Andreas, 2018. "The cross-section of expected stock returns in the property/liability insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 292-321.
    4. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike, 2014. "Disagreement between rating agencies and bond opacity: A theoretical perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 82-85.
    5. Courtney B. Baggett & Cassandra R. Cole, 2023. "Insurance groups, product diversification, and the role of surplus lines affiliation," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 35-56, March.
    6. Chia‐Chun Chiang & Hugh Hoikwang Kim & Greg Niehaus, 2022. "Opaque liabilities, learning, and the cost of equity capital for insurers," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1031-1076, December.
    7. Martin Eling, 2012. "What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 185-223, September.
    8. Selim Mankaï & Aymen Belgacem, 2016. "Interactions Between Risk Taking, Capital, and Reinsurance for Property–Liability Insurance Firms," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1007-1043, December.
    9. Stoyanova, Rayna & Schlütter, Sebastian, 2012. "Safety versus affordability as targets of insurance regulation in an opaque market: A welfare approach," ICIR Working Paper Series 10/12, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    10. Stoyanova, Rayna & Gründl, Helmut, 2013. "Solvency II: A driver for mergers and acquisitions?," ICIR Working Paper Series 13/13, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    11. Selim Mankaï & Aymen Belgacem, 2013. "Interactions Between Risk-Taking, Capital, and Reinsurance for Property-Liability Insurance Firms," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    12. Abad, Pilar & Ferreras, Rodrigo & Robles, M.-Dolores, 2020. "Information opacity and corporate bond returns: The dynamics of split ratings," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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