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Rules and institutions for sound fiscal policy after the crisis

Author

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  • Daniele Franco (editor)

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

The volume collects the essays presented at the 13th Workshop on Public Finance organised by Banca d'Italia in Perugia on 31 March-2 April 2011. The workshop concentrated on the measures aimed at guaranteeing sustainable budget policies in the aftermath of the global crisis started in 2008, affording special consideration to rules and institutions. Session 1 analysed the experiences that took shape in individual states thanks to their own budget frameworks and institutions. Session 2 investigated the evolution and the reform of European fiscal guidelines. Session 3 dealt with independent authorities and the rules intended to put a check on public expenditure. The final session was devoted to possible future developments of national norms and budget institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniele Franco (editor), 2012. "Rules and institutions for sound fiscal policy after the crisis," Workshop and Conferences 11, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:workpa:sec_11
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/collana-seminari-convegni/2012-0011/Intero_Volume.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Peta, 2017. "Public works procurement in the new code: a legal and economic assessment of the main measures," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 400, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Vikas Dixit, 2016. "Fiscal Rule and Social Sector Spending: A Study of North-East India," India Studies in Business and Economics, in: Swapnendu Banerjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee & Sushil Kumar Haldar (ed.), Understanding Development, edition 1, chapter 11, pages 155-171, Springer.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutions; fiscal policy; crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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