Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
bargaining; commitment; conflict; delay; international negotiations; climate negotiations; legislative; multilateral; voting; majority; unanimity;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2024-07-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2024-07-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2024-07-22 (Microeconomics)
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